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On-Demand Aviation: Governance
Challenges of Urban Air Mobility (“UAM”)
Timothy M. Ravich*
ABSTRACT
The first generation that has never known a world without
smartphones and social media may be close to making the world forget
about traditional cars. Investment is pouring into urban air mobility
(“UAM”)—the local, on-demand movement of people and goods by air
using a range of piloted and semi- and fully autonomous electric aircraft
that take off and land vertically. In fact, the innovation of aerial ridesharing
at scale—a technology that is still very much associated with the 1960s
cartoon series “The Jetsons”—may be at market as soon as 2025,
according to some estimates.
UAM—which is also referred to as on-demand mobility (“ODM”)—
will revolutionize urban transportation and personal mobility, and impact
matters from airspace management to aviation safety and property rights
in unknown ways. For example, UAM will compete, supplement, and/or
exist alongside traditional air and ground traffic operations, while in other
cases, traditional transportation nodes such as airports might be
intertwined and become a functional element of UAM systems
themselves. To say that airports and the communities surrounding airports
need to understand and anticipate the effects and opportunities of the UAM
market is an understatement.
This Article addresses the emerging UAM market, including the
relevant technologies from a legal and regulatory perspective. In
conceptualizing a new world in which UAM is real, this Article will
explore the various stages of legal, regulatory, and technological
development of UAM. It also addresses practical questions such as how
UAM and traditional transportation aviation operations might coexist in
shared airspace and if and how communities will respond to environmental
concerns such as UAM-generated noise. In all, this Article serves as a
primer, presenting the substance and scope of UAM governance as
presently configured, and where gaps exist (and many do), explores
*Associate Professor, University of Central Florida, Department of Legal Studies ©
2020. Comments invited at timothy.ravich@ucf.edu.
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potential regulatory and socio-technological solutions to the challenges
posed by advances in autonomous-, self-, and optionally-piloted aircraft
systems.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Imagine traveling from San Francisco’s Marina to work in
downtown San Jose—a drive that would normally occupy the better part
of two hours—in only 15 minutes.”1 Or, “[w]hat if you could save nearly
four hours round-trip between São Paulo’s city center and the suburbs in
Campinas?”2 Or, “imagine reducing your 90-plus minute stop-and-go
commute from Gurgaon to your office in central Delhi to a mere six
minutes.”3 These enticing hypotheticals are set out at the beginning of a
white paper Uber published in 2016 about the feasibility of air taxi
operations and the concept of on-demand aviation. The animating idea of
on-demand aviation is a network of small, two-to-nine passenger electricpowered aircraft that take off and land vertically, making possible rapid
and regular air transportation between and within suburbs and cities.4
Think flying cars.

1. UBER ELEVATE, Fast-Forwarding to a Future of On-Demand Urban Air
Transportation, UBER, Oct. 27, 2016, at 1, available at https://www.uber.com/elevate.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id. While industry, academia, and government focus on the minimization of doorto-door trip time resulting from UAM, commercial airlines are testing the maximum
endurance limits of human beings on ultralong flights made possible by new fuel-efficient
jetliners (i.e., New York to Sydney nonstop). See, e.g., Mike Cherney, Qantas to Test
Human Endurance for a 19-Hour Flight, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://on.wsj.com/2UZ5GwR (discussing Qantas Airways Ltd. plans to send wired-up
employees on a 19-hour trip to see whether humans can keep up with technological
advances. “Cabin passengers—mostly Qantas employees—also will don wearable devices.
Scientists and medical experts from the University of Sydney will monitor sleep patterns,
food and beverage consumption, lighting and human movement in the cabin during the test
flights.”).
4. UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 1.
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However futuristic the concept may sound, aerial ridesharing at scale
may be at market sooner rather than later. As a 2018 publication by the
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics stated, “[a]viation
technologies and concepts have reached a level of maturity that may soon
enable an era of [on-demand mobility] fueled by quiet, efficient, and
largely automated air taxis.”5 In fact, startup and established companies
around the world, often with the substantial financial backing of venture
capitalists, are researching, building, and testing “[a] network of small,
electric aircraft that take off and land vertically, . . . [for the purpose of
enabling] rapid, reliable transportation between suburbs and cities, and
ultimately, within cities.”6 This new generation of piloted, semi-, and fully
autonomous electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (“eVTOL”)7 aircraft
feature the latest advances in artificial intelligence, propulsion and other
advanced technologies. Encouraged by the emergence of new paradigms
for aviation traffic management, manufacturers of eVTOL aircraft
envision a wide variety of use cases for the technology. These uses include
on-demand air taxi operations moving people between fixed or ad hoc
locations; air cargo operations moving goods between warehouses and
stores; regularly scheduled “air metro” operations transporting passengers
between a set of fixed locations; emergency medical evacuations, rescue
operations, and humanitarian missions; law enforcement operations;
newsgathering; weather monitoring; and ground traffic assessment.8
Altogether, the vision and concept of operations (“CONOPS”) for
on-demand aviation—an idea interchangeably referred to as on-demand
mobility (“ODM”) or urban air mobility (“UAM”)—is about getting
people and goods to their destinations more quickly than can be
accomplished by cars today.9 The viability of UAM lies in the fact that
ODM imagines a node-based transportation system whose resiliency
exceeds that of path-based transportation systems.10 Indeed, “[j]ust as
5. Eric Mueller et al., Enabling Airspace Integration for High-Density On-Demand
Mobility Operations, AM. INST. OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, 2017, at 1, available
at https://go.nasa.gov/3aJs5VA.
6. UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 2.
7. Pronounced “e-vee-tol.”
8. David P. Thipphavong et al., Urban Air Mobility Airspace Integration Concepts
and Considerations, NASA TECH. REPORTS SERVER, 2018, at 7, available at
https://go.nasa.gov/2UG80tu.
9. As researchers for NASA have noted, however, ODM is a broader term than UAM
where “UAM is the subset of ODM that is focused on air traffic operations in metropolitan
areas with aircraft capable of seating a small number of passengers or equivalent volume
of goods flying trips of 100 nautical miles or less.” Id. at 1–2. This Article uses the terms
UAM and ODM to refer to aerial ridesharing in a metropolitan area, but the terms are also
sometimes used to refer to a range different operations, including last mile, cargo, people,
cargo and people, urban core, and eVTOL.
10. A node-based transportation system involves takeoff and landing areas whereas a
path-based transportation system involves ground surface roads. See Thipphavong et al.,
supra note 8, at 5. See also Michael D. Patterson et al., A Proposed Approach to Studying
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skyscrapers allowed cities to use limited land more efficiently,” Uber has
argued, “urban air transportation will use three-dimensional airspace to
alleviate transportation congestion on the ground.”11 By rising above “the
highly congested one-dimensional ground highway ant-trails, [companies
in the UAM space such as Uber, through its “Uber Elevate” initiative, are
working] to take advantage of three dimensions and create pathwayindependent transportation solutions.”12 Ironically, in doing so, Uber is
focused not merely on easing some of the traffic congestion and gridlock
to which its operations contribute—an ironic state of affairs for a
transportation network company (“TPN”) that pioneered the sharing and
services economy.13 Indeed, Uber seems intent on upending and bypassing
its own revolutionary car-based business by reimagining “heavy
infrastructure” approaches involving roads, rail, bridges, and tunnels.14 In
this respect, UAM perhaps represents a natural and decisive next step in a
national trend away from the automobile.15
Unlike an automobile, an air taxi would have “a unique ability to
meet future on-demand services, as it is essentially unencumbered by
ground-based limitations, along with the ability to achieve greater
Urban Air Mobility Missions including and Initial Exploration of Mission Requirements,
NASA TECH. REPORTS SERVER, 2018, at 1, available at https://go.nasa.gov/2whdQs4.
11. See also Kevin R. Antcliff et al., Silicon Valley as an Early Adopter for OnDemand Civil VTOL Operations, AMERICAN INST. OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS,
2016, at 1, available at https://go.nasa.gov/34aOUPm (identifying and evaluating the San
Jose-San Francisco-Oakland area to evaluate the objective of minimizing door-to-door
time for “Hyper Commuters” (frequent, long-distance commuters) in the Silicon Valley
through the development of new helipad infrastructure for ultra-low noise VTOL aircraft).
12. Id. at 2; see also Urban Air Mobility: Hearing Before U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Science, Space, & Technology, 115th Cong. (2018)
(testimony of Michael Thacker, Executive Vice President of Technology and Innovation,
Bell), https://bit.ly/3cA5Zp5 [hereinafter Thacker Testimony] (“We believe the real
solutions to the future of Urban Mobility lie not in the two-dimensional world of roads,
buses, and other traditional options, but in new frameworks and partnerships based on
multi-faceted ways of thinking about the possibilities.”).
13. Eliot Brown, The Ride-Hail Utopia Got Stuck in Traffic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15–
16, 2020, at B1 (citing a 2019 study finding that over 60% of the slowdown of traffic speeds
in San Francisco between 2010 and 2016 was due to the introduction of the ride-hail
companies).
14. See, e.g., Christopher Mims, How Self-Driving Cars Could End Uber, WALL ST.
J. (May 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://on.wsj.com/3c2yNGi (“Uber’s philosophy, both
internally and in its pitch to consumers, is that it’s a hassle to own a car. The irony is, for
the pay-by-the-ride future of transportation to be realized, someone has to own a lot of cars.
Chances are, it won’t be Uber.”). See also Graham Warwick, Urban Renewal, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 23, 2019–Jan. 12, 2020, at 97 (“Automotive manufacturers have
been significant investors in UAM, led by Daimler, Toyota and China’s Geely.”).
15. See, e.g., David Harrison, America’s Love Affair with Driving Takes a Back Seat,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://on.wsj.com/2xmDdZT; Tim Higgins, The
End of Car Ownership, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2017, 10:10 PM),
https://on.wsj.com/34rU3mb; Christina Rogers & Gautham Nagesh, Driving is Losing its
Allure for Most Americans, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2016, 5:30 AM),
https://on.wsj.com/2UWmpls.
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distribution and speed.”16 According to Uber, “millions of hours are
wasted on the road worldwide” annually—the equivalent of commuting
“seven whole working weeks” in a year in some cases.17 According to a
study published by the American Journal of Preventative Medicine,
moreover, transportation congestion on the ground correlates with
elevated blood pressure for commuters traveling more than 10 miles.18
Given this, the idea of flying to-and-from work, or flying relatively short
distances between any two points in the same city (e.g., trips of 20 miles),19
without the delays associated with traditional cars or scheduled
commercial aviation service, is compelling. What is more, the principle
selling point of on-demand aviation—recapturing productivity and leisure
time lost while commuting—is not only conceptually appealing, but is also
potentially widely available and affordable to the general public.20
In addition to convenience, UAM offers the benefit of requiring
relatively little ground infrastructure. Indeed, UAM operations project to
be implemented more quickly and at a lower cost compared to other
ground-based modes. Instead of extensive roads, overpasses, bridges,
tracks, and right-of-ways, the primary physical infrastructure UAM need
are vertiports that have relatively small footprints.21 Specifically,
vertiports can be built on top of buildings, parking structures, floating
barges, or in roadway cloverleaves re-purposed with raised helipad
structures.22 This may result in smaller capital expenditures to integrate
UAM into metropolitan areas and more rapid expansion of connectivity
between existing areas or into new areas, compared to ground-based
modes.23
No wonder, then, that interest in UAM is bourgeoning in both private
and public spheres. Interested parties include gig economy innovators like
Uber, aerospace giants like Airbus, and new startups like Terrafugia,
together with government agencies like the National Aeronautics and
16. Kevin R. Antcliff et al., supra note 11, at 1.
17. UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 2.
18. See, e.g., Christine M. Hoehner et al., Commuting Distance, Cardiorespiratory
Fitness, and Metabolic Risk, 42 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED. 571, 575 (2012)
(“Commuting distance was negatively associated with physical activity and CRF and
positively associated with BMI, waist circumference, systolic and diastolic blood pressure,
and continuous metabolic score in fully adjusted linear regression models.”).
19. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY: LONG DISTANCE TRANSPORTATION PATTERNS
(2006), available at https://bit.ly/3b1XL8y.
20. See UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1.
21. See id. at 51–52.
22. See id.
23. See Thipphavong et al., supra note 8, at 5 (“On the other hand, if most UAM
aircraft are electrically-powered, UAM could add significant electrical infrastructure
requirements for electrical power generation and transmission. Fortunately, it is expected
that the electrical infrastructure will be expanded anyway to support the anticipated growth
in the number of ground vehicles with electric powertrains.”).
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Space Administration (“NASA”) and European Union Aviation Safety
Agency (“EASA”). Both private and public entities have invested
significant attention to cultivating a collaborative ecosystem among
regulators and regulated actors, including eVTOL manufacturers, builders
of takeoff and landing areas, and researchers of the airspace integration
concepts, technologies, and procedures needed to conduct UAM safely
and efficiently alongside other airspace users.24 As a result, some eVTOL
manufacturers are now manufacturing prototypes and testing ODM
CONOPS, including Airbus in Brazil,25 Kitty Hawk in New Zealand,26 and
Volocopter in the United Arab Emirates.27
Accepting the idea that high-tempo, high-density UAM operations
could one day be as routine and reliable as traditional airline travel is
today, this Article addresses the emerging UAM market, including the
relevant technologies, from a legal, regulatory, and policy perspective. In
imagining and conceptualizing a new world in which UAM is real, this
Article explores and critiques the various stages of legal, regulatory, and
technological development of UAM. Part II details UAM aircraft and
operations and establishes background for understanding ODM. Part III
then sets out the legal and regulatory barriers for UAM, including issues
of jurisdiction, safety and security, airspace integration, and community
acceptance. Finally, Part IV, drawing from lessons learned from the
rulemaking process associated with unmanned aerial systems—“UASs” or
“drones”—presents and analyzes normative and policy-related questions,
arguing in favor a legal and regulatory environment that encourages
development of UAM. Ultimately, this Article presents the substance and
scope of existing UAM governance, and where gaps exist (and many do),
addresses regulatory and socio-technological solutions that may solve
challenges posed by advances in autonomous and optionally-piloted
aircraft systems.
II.

BACKGROUND

UAM operations are likely to emerge in three phases. First, so-called
emergent UAM operations will be characterized by low-tempo, lowdensity flights along a small set of fixed routes between a few takeoff and
landing areas (“TOLAs”).28 The aircraft serving these operations will
likely be piloted by professional airmen, and eventually, fully automated
24. See id.
25. See Jeffrey Lewis & Luciana Magalhaes, Here Come Helicopters on Demand,
WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2017), https://on.wsj.com/2UXnqsp.
26. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Larry Page’s Flying Taxis, Now Existing Stealth Mode,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2xI5Osy.
27. See Mariella Moon, Dubai Tests a Passenger Drone for Its Flying Taxi Service,
ENDGADGET (Sept. 26, 2017), https://engt.co/2w9YRA0.
28. See Thipphavong et al., supra note 8, at 3.
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aircraft capable of high-density ODM operations.29 Early expanded UAM
operations represent a second phase, characterized by higher-tempo,
higher-density flights in a small network of vertiports (or “vertistops”)
feeding a common hub location and managed by UAM operator and thirdparty services.30 Finally, mature UAM operations would feature hightempo, high-density flights in a network with multiple hub locations,
potentially with orders-of-magnitude more vehicles and operations in an
area than are currently supported in the national airspace system
(“NAS”).31
Interestingly, whether or not UAM operations evolve along this
predicted continuum, from emergent to mature, the operation of numerous
and frequent air traffic operations within metropolitan areas is not
unprecedented. Commercial UAM operations began in the United States
in the 1940s with the operation of helicopters.32 Between 1947 and 1971,
Los Angeles Airways connected passengers and mail between dozens of
locations in the Los Angeles Basin, including Disneyland and Los Angeles
International Airport.33 During the same time period, New York Airways
flew passengers between heliports in Manhattan and the region’s three
airports—LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark.34 In 1968, however, Los Angeles
Airways ceased operations after mechanical failures caused two separate
fatal accidents.35 New York Airways stopped flying almost a decade later,
in 1977, also after several mechanical failures caused the deaths and
injuries of dozens of passengers, crew members, and bystanders at
heliports.36 Technological advances have rejuvenated both interest and
confidence in the concept of connecting urban destinations by air,
however.37
Two advances in particular—distributed electric propulsion (“DEP”)
and autonomous operation technologies—differentiate the aircraft
envisaged in future UAM operations from the on-demand helicopter
operations decades ago. In fact, A3/Airbus’s Vahana concept,38 eVolo’s
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.; see also Brian Garrett-Glaser, Skyryse Unveils Autonomous Helicopter
for Urban Air Mobility, Targets Economics of Commuter Cars, AVIONICS INT’L (Dec. 17,
2019), https://bit.ly/2UXh6Bg; Saulo B. Cwerner, Vertical Flight and Urban Mobilities:
The Promise and Reality of Helicopter Travel, 1 MOBILITIES 191 (2006).
33. See Thipphavong et al., supra note 8, at 2.
34. See id.
35. See Scott Harrison, From the Archives: Los Angeles Airways Helicopter
Overturns, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://lat.ms/2Jy8RX0.
36. See Thipphavong et al., supra note 8, at 2; see also Richard Witkin, New York
Airways Acts to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 1979), https://nyti.ms/3e1Nawy.
37. But see Bill Chappell, What We Know: The Helicopter Crash that Killed Kobe
Bryant and 8 Others, NPR (Jan. 27, 2020), https://n.pr/3aF4wNr.
38. See Vahana, AIRBUS, https://bit.ly/2RvqkDT (last visited May 20, 2020).
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18-prop Volocopter,39 and eHang’s 184 quad/octocopter40 are platforms
that, in important ways, are unlike helicopters. As Uber has explained:
VTOL operations will involve the ability to take off with a rapid climb
at a steep glide path angle to reach a cruising altitude up to a few
thousand feet, then decelerate to land vertically at the end of the trip.
There will likely be a limited need to hover for durations not exceeding
one minute, with most vertical takeoff and landing transitions taking
place in approximately 30 seconds. Helicopters, on the other hand, are
designed for military and multi-use roles that require sustained
hovering for extended time (search and rescue, powerline inspection,
takeoff and landing at unprepared locations, etc.). Hence helicopters
are currently designed to optimize for hover efficiency, rather than for
cruise. VTOLs will spend far more time in cruise which raises the
question of how to optimize such a vehicle across short-term hover
power versus long-term cruise energy.41

Thus, VTOL technology, augmented by DEP and automation, offers the
potential to overcome four primary barriers to commercial aerial
ridesharing: safety, noise, emissions, and vehicle performance.42
Given the promise of these technological advances, more than 200
companies are currently developing and manufacturing DEP and VTOL
concepts; among the firms involved are Aurora (Boeing subsidiary),43
Astro,44 Bell,45 Cora,46 Joby Aviation,47 Lilium,48 Moog,49 Porsche,50
Skypod Aerospace Corp.,51 Uber Elevate,52 VRCO,53 Xwing, 54 and

39. See VOLOCOPTER, https://bit.ly/2XsUnzB (last visited May 20, 2020).
40. See Passenger Transportation, EHANG, https://bit.ly/39Yf6OG (last visited May
20, 2020).
41. UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 35.
42. See id. at 14.
43. See AURORA FLIGHT SCIENCES, https://bit.ly/2VkLntH (last visited May 20,
2020).
44. See ASTRO, https://bit.ly/2xaOdd1 (last visited April 2, 2020).
45. See BELL TEXTRON INC., https://bit.ly/2Xp19q7 (last visited May 20, 2020).
46. See WISK AERO LLC, https://bit.ly/2y1HMZQ (last visited May 20, 2020).
47. See JOBY AVIATION, https://bit.ly/3c2BibE (last visited May 20, 2020).
48. See LILIUM, https://bit.ly/39WQC8b (last visited May 20, 2020).
49. See MOOG INC., https://bit.ly/2y3hTbW (last visited May 20, 2020).
50. See Press Release, Boeing, Porsche and Boeing to Partner on Premium Urban Air
Mobility Market (Oct. 10, 2019) https://bit.ly/3ee7PNO.
51. See SKYPOD AEROSPACE CORP., https://bit.ly/34tAqub (last visited May 20, 2020).
52. See Andrew G. Simpson, Look! Up in the Sky. Uber and Hyundai Unveil Air Taxi,
INS. J. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/2XuRE8X (reporting that Uber and Hyundai Motor Co.
announced they will develop Uber Air Taxis for a future aerial ride share network). The
companies unveiled a new full-scale aircraft concept at the Consumer Electronics Show
(CES) in Las Vegas. See id.
53. See VRCO LTD., https://bit.ly/2UZPYCF (last visited Apr. 3, 2020).
54. See XWING, https://bit.ly/2y8CYC0 (last visited May 20, 2020).
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Zee.Aero (Google).55 The ODM aircraft these and other firms are
developing typically fall into one of two configuration types: (1) large
multicopters classified by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)
as rotorcraft because lift during all phases of flight is generated by
powered propellers or rotors; or (2) aircraft that use powered-lift (e.g., tiltrotors or -wings) for takeoff and landing but transition to wing-borne flight
during cruise.56
While the ODM designs that are best suited or preferred for particular
types of missions and metropolitan areas remain to be seen,57 what a UAM
trip might look like is easier to imagine. As a report by the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics states:
“[H]igh-density” operations . . . would consist of approximately 1200
aircraft operating simultaneously over a large metropolitan area (e.g.,
the San Francisco Bay area, New York City, the Dallas-Fort Worth
metro area). This fleet size equates to approximately one aircraft per
nmi, compared with typical maximum enroute traffic densities of about
one aircraft per 250 to 500 nmi (densities increase significantly near
airports, but are still far lower than this ODM reference scenario).
Such a fleet might average four trips per hour, each carrying two
passengers, over a 16-hour day. This scenario could support
approximately 150,000 passengers per day, which would make it an
important travel mode alternative to ground transportation, but it
would still represent a very small proportion of the overall
transportation options available to the public (about 2% of the
automobile trips taken in the San Francisco Bay area per day).58

Amazingly, UAM manufacturers and operators have identified and even
resolved many of the operational issues associated ODM activities. As
Michael Thacker, Executive Vice President for Technology and
Innovation at Bell, testified before the House of Representative’s Science,
Space, and Technology Committee:
Beyond the environment driving vehicle and operating requirements,
there are myriad operating details to consider, including vertiport
locations, charging stations, ground safety protocols, secure passenger
identification and access, and more. We also cannot ignore normal
aviation operational requirements for vehicle identification,
55. See Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, Welcome to Larry Page’s Secret Flying-Car
Factories, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2016), https://bloom.bg/3e6KHkt.
56. See Mueller et al., supra note 5, at 3 (discussing “[a] third category, conventional
take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft, are most often used in an ODM context for flying
hundreds of miles between airports that are underserved by scheduled commercial
operations. Because these flights inherently traverse less-used airspace they do not face the
same airspace integration concerns of the first two aircraft categories”).
57. See Thipphavong et al., supra note 8, at 7–8.
58. Mueller et al., supra note 5, at 3.

666

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:3

communication and separation in a potentially more constrained
airspace, or standard requirements and practices for maintenance,
inspections and continued airworthiness.
Most, if not all, of these operational challenges have been addressed in
some form in existing aircraft operations. We obviously already
operate helicopters in many urban locations today. The system gaps
come due to potential increases in traffic volume, particularly in low
altitude airspace, and the increasing use of automation to enhance
operational safety and efficiency.59

In other words, for flying on-demand or scheduled air taxi operations to
become regular and reliable, several technical challenges must be
overcome. But, that may just be a factor of time. The greatest challenge
may lie in the fact that lawmakers must fill regulatory gaps and dispel
popular associations of UAM with the make-believe flying cars of the
1960s cartoon series “The Jetsons.”
III. LEGAL AND REGULATORY BARRIERS
UAM will revolutionize personal mobility and impact traditional
transportation modalities in innumerable ways. Although some rules of the
road exist, UAM may require altogether new rules. For example, Part 14
of the Code of Federal Regulations establishes detailed rules for the
operation of aircraft with an onboard pilot.60 But, for remotely piloted and
autonomous UAM operations to become regular and reliable, lawmakers
will need to modify rules currently applicable to drones, or else develop
new regulations addressing, inter alia, the following types of activities and
missions:61


Beyond visual line of sight operations, which are currently
addressed only through a waiver process under 14 C.F.R. §
107.31;



Operations over people, streets, etc., which are currently
addressed only through a waiver process under 14 C.F.R. §
107.39;



The commercial carriage of air cargo across state lines;



Air ambulance activities, e.g., when a passenger or patient is being
transported in a UAM either within visual line of sight or beyond;



Flight in instrument conditions;

59. See also Thacker Testimony, supra note 12.
60. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21, 23, 25, 27, 36, 61, 91, 119 (2019).
61. BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, URBAN AIR MOBILITY (UAM) MARKET STUDY 20–21
(2018), available at https://go.nasa.gov/2Js4Nr6.
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Airworthiness certification of remotely piloted and autonomous
aircraft; and



Training and knowledge requirements for pilots and operators.
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Additionally, ODM will require lawmakers outside of the aviation
regulatory framework to address general concerns such as airspace
management and property rights, environmental matters, privacy, and
safety. The success of UAM, therefore, seems (at least initially) to turn on
the resolution of these legal issues. But, as a report by the MITRE
Corporation put it, “[j]udging from the scale of the investments, number
of proponents, progress to date, and the current state of technology
development in the UAS industry . . . it is not a matter of if UAM will
happen but a matter of how quickly regulatory environments and
operations policies” can change, enabling full-scale operations.62 This next
section details the most significant potential legal obstacles to UAM,
namely issues of federalism, preemption, airspace, and community
acceptance.
A.

Federalism

UAM flights will occur exclusively within state or local jurisdictions.
Indeed, all the various definitions of UAM revolve around a common idea
that envisions an airplane of some kind serving inter-city and intra-city
routes between local TOLAs within 20 miles of each other. But UAM
operations invariably will impact stakeholders and interests beyond city
and state borders. For example, federal interests will be implicated as
eVTOL aircraft fly in the national airspace (i.e., 500 feet above the
ground).63 As such, and as with other areas of law and emerging
technologies, courts will be called on to resolve a “tug of war” between
federal and state/local authority as each government vies for the power to
regulate UAM.64 Identifying the lead regulatory authority among local,
state, and federal regulators is thus a primary legal and regulatory
challenge that must be addressed to bring UAM transportation to market.
As a starting point, states wield significant lawmaking powers. While
federal law is the “supreme Law of the lLand,” states, pursuant to the
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, possess unenumerated rights and
powers “not delegated to the United States.”65 For example, although
62. BROCK LASCARA ET AL., URBAN AIR MOBILITY LANDSCAPE REPORT 6 (Mitre
Corp., 2018), available at https://bit.ly/3avKyVf (“Judging from the scale of the
investments, number of proponents, progress to date, and the current state of technology
development in the UAS industry, we believe it is not a matter of if UAM will happen but
a matter of how quickly regulatory environments and operations policies can adapt to
permit full-scale operations.”).
63. See infra Section III.B.
64. See HAMILTON, supra note 61, at 20–21.
65. U.S. CONST. amend X.
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courts have ruled that states have no authority to regulate the prices, routes,
and services of airlines under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,66 state
and local lawmakers (alone or in tandem with federal authorities) have
long governed other aviation issues, ranging from airport licensing and
funding to aircraft registration and recordation to land use and zoning.67
Judges, too, have established a substantial body of state and federal law
concerning airports,68 aviation infrastructure and environment,69 airplane
accidents,70 remedies,71 and torts including aircraft product liability suits.72
Moreover, pursuant to their police powers to promote the health, safety,
and welfare of their inhabitants, state and local officials routinely enact
and prosecute criminal and civil laws such as negligence, trespass,
nuisance, and invasions of privacy arising from aviation activities. The
laws of different states sometimes conflict, however, and the issue of
whether or how to harmonize the laws of several states within the nation’s
constitutional framework has come before courts.
The case of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota is an early
example.73 At issue was the constitutionality of a state tax codified in the
1930s. Minnesota enacted and assessed a general ad valorem property tax
upon “all personal property of persons residing therein, including the
property of corporations.”74 The airline based its personal property tax
return on the number of its planes in Minnesota.75 The state of Minnesota
assessed the tax against the airline more broadly, however. It computed
“taxes on the basis of the [airline’s] entire fleet coming into Minnesota”
from other states.76 The United States Supreme Court evaluated how
66. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2018).
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 330.30 (2005) (a 1947 law requiring state approval
of airport registration, licensure, and site selection).
68. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683
(1992) (noting Port Authority’s regulation forbidding certain speech in airport terminals
did not violate the First Amendment).
69. See, e.g., Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands &
Watercourses Comm’n, 681 F. Supp. 2d 182, 206, 210 (D. Conn. 2010) (ruling that federal
aviation safety regulations did not preempt generally applicable state and local
environmental laws).
70. See, e.g., Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70, 84 (Fla. 2011) (finding that Congress
did not preempt Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine where aviation fatality did
not occur “on the surface of the earth”).
71. See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that federal law preempted state or territorial standards of care relating to aviation
safety, but not traditional state and territorial remedies that apply to the violation of those
standards).
72. See, e.g., Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 709 (3d Cir. 2016)
(ruling that federal preemption in the field of aviation safety did not extend to state products
liability claims).
73. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
74. Id. at 294 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 272.01 (1941)).
75. See id. at 293.
76. Id.
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Minnesota’s taxation impacted interstate commerce and, more
particularly, “whether the Commerce Clause or Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment barred Minnesota from enforcing the personal
property tax it [levied] on the entire fleet of airplanes owned . . . and
operated by [Northwest Airlines] in interstate transportation.”77
A majority of the Court upheld the state’s taxing power, finding that
it did not run afoul of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the
Minnesota tax was not a tax “for engaging in interstate commerce or upon
airlines specifically.”78 The court also reasoned that the tax was neither
aimed at nor measured by interstate commerce.79 Finally, the tax was not
assessed against airplanes continually outside of Minnesota during the
relevant tax year.80
More remarkable than these legal conclusions were the context in
which the case arose and the rationale underlying the court’s holding. The
Minnesota statute in Northwest Airlines, Inc. presented a novel context—
air transportation—in which to referee the relations between and among
states. To approach the unprecedented issues before it, the Court relied on
and extended laws and policies applicable to other transportation
modalities—especially steamships—to the then-revolutionary reality of
commercial airplanes flying regularly above and across state lines.81
To illustrate, the Court noted that air commerce at the time of
Northwest Airlines, Inc.—the mid-1940s—was at an early stage in
development, roughly comparable to that of steamship navigation in the
1820s.82 Vessels, the Court recognized, were taxable only at their domicile
or home ports under the “home port theory.”83 Given that Northwest
Airlines was incorporated and based in the state of Minnesota,84 the Court
analogized commercial airplanes with steamship vessels, and found that
Minnesota was the home port for the airline’s aircraft.85 In doing so, the
Court applied established ideas of state sovereignty and tax jurisdiction to
a new dimension—the airspace above cities, states, and the nation.
Notably, the Court recognized that its holding—obtained by
analogizing the two-dimensional operation of vessels to the threedimensional operation of airplanes—was imperfect.86 But the Court also
recognized that the law was destined to trail behind innovation and that
77. Id. at 292.
78. Id. at 294.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 302 (Jackson, J., concurring).
83. The Home Port Doctrine Held Applicable to Foreign Air Commerce, 23 OHIO.
ST. L.J. 561, 562 (1962); see also Hays v. Pac. Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. 596, 599 (1854).
84. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 292 (1944).
85. See id. at 294–95.
86. See id. at 300.
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new technologies would always require legal philosophies to catch up,
particularly in terms of innovations in mobility and travel.87 Indeed,
Northwest Airlines, Inc. centered on the narrow issue of applying the
doctrine of tax apportion among states in matters of air commerce. But
Northwest Airlines, Inc.’s importance for UAM firms may lie in what it
says about how courts approach the difficult issue of mediating the laws
of 50 states and of the federal government—especially where a uniform
approach to emerging technologies is undesirable or unrealistic.
Just as Minnesota acted in its own self-interest in Northwest Airlines,
Inc. so too are states and municipalities likely to codify UAM rules that
express local solutions to local concerns—just as they are in the context of
other disruptive aviation technologies.88 In doing so, such laws may
potentially conflict with the laws of other jurisdictions. Judicial restraint
is optimal in that circumstance, as Justice Frankfurter explained in
Northwest Airlines, Inc.:
The doctrine of tax apportionment has been painfully evolved in
working out the financial relations between the States and interstate
transportation and communication conducted on land and thereby
forming a part of the organic life of these States. Although a part of the
taxing systems of this country, the rule of apportionment is beset with
friction, waste and difficulties, but at all events it grew out of, and has
established itself in regard to land commerce. To what extent it should
be carried over to the totally new problems presented by the very
different modes of transportation and communication that the airplane
and the radio have already introduced, let alone the still more subtle
and complicated technological facilities that are on the horizon, raises
questions that we ought not to anticipate; certainly we ought not to
embarrass the future by judicial answers which at best can deal only
in a truncated way with problems sufficiently difficult even for
legislative statesmanship.
Each new means of interstate transportation and communication has
engendered controversy regarding the taxing powers of the States inter
se and as between the States and the Federal Government. Such
controversies and some conflict and confusion are inevitable under a
federal system.89

In this context, like ships, railroad rolling stock, the radio, and even
commercial airliners before it, UAM portends a new era of controversies
centered on the concept of federalism—the constitutional relationship
between the 50 state governments and the national federal government.
87. See id.
88. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the
Things They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57 (2013) (advocating for a state-based approach
to privacy regulation that governs drone use by civilians).
89. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
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While the precise nature of the relationship among local, state, and federal
authorities relative to UAM is unclear at this point, it is likely to have a
distinctly national flavor.
The role of the federal government in aviation matters since the 1940s
has grown exponentially. Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Northwest
Airlines, Inc. anticipated as much. Though he agreed with the majority’s
support for a state’s taxing authority (in the absence of a better analogy
than the home port theory traditionally applied to ships), he also
recognized a trend in the law—an emerging and near-total divestment of
state power over air space and air commerce as a matter of law:
Aviation has added a new dimension to travel and to our ideas. The
ancient idea that landlordism and sovereignty extend from the center
of the world to the periphery of the universe has been modified. Today
the landowner no more possesses a vertical control of all the air above
him than a shore owner possesses horizontal control of all the sea
before him. The air is too precious as an open highway to permit it to
be “owned” to the exclusion or embarrassment of air navigation by
surface landlords who could put it to little real use.
Students of our legal evolution know how this Court interpreted the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution to lift navigable waters of the
United States out of local controls and into the domain of federal
control. Air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably
federalized by the commerce clause than is navigable water. Local
exactions and barriers to free transit in the air would neutralize its
indifference to space and its conquest of time.90

In fact, in the more than 75 years since the Supreme Court rendered its
opinion in Northwest Airlines, Inc., federal law has become pervasive in
aviation matters, ranging from airport funding and security to airline safety
and passenger rights.91 Room for the exercise of state and local
government power in the UAM space appears minimal in this context. Yet,
for local UAM operations to take flight, state and local lawmakers must
be integrally involved in the regulatory space and a high degree of
cooperation between the FAA and state, local, and tribal governments
must occur.
B.

Preemption

In general, federal, state, and local authorities govern independently
of (or concurrently with) each other consistent with the principles of
federalism enshrined in the Constitution. But State or local laws
sometimes conflict with federal law. Similarly, local ordinances may clash

90. Id. at 302.
91. See id. at 303.
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with statutes enacted at the state level.92 In such cases, courts are often
asked to resolve questions of preemption, i.e., whether federal law entirely
divests and displaces state and local law or whether state and local laws
can coexist alongside federal law. The doctrine of preemption poses a
particular challenge for innovators and consumers of disruptive
technologies such as UAM because, notwithstanding the local character of
air taxi operations, ODM implicates state- and nation-wide interests.
Local, state, and federal UAM regulatory initiatives inevitably conflict,
not merely overlap.
Among the most pressing preemption-related questions (existing or
anticipated) for UAM firms are, for example:


Into which government authority—local, state, national, or
international—should the power to manage airspace for UAM
operations vest?



Who, among local, state, or federal authorities, should regulate
property issues related to UAM operations, including the
vertiports from which UAM eVTOL will take-off and land?



How will responsibility for issues such as safety, security, privacy,
nuisance, and trespass be shared among local, state, and federal
regulators? Should they be shared?



Within what jurisdiction—local, state, or federal—will issues
such as ODM passenger and contract rights fall?

Scant precedent from traditional manned aviation law exists for UAM
firms to answer these questions directly or by analogy. In civil aviation
matters,93 for example, many of the nation’s largest airports draw funding
from federal sources though they are managed by airport authorities that
are arms of the localities in which they are situated. Such a scheme may
not make sense in the UAM space, however, given that TOLAs will be
situated within the boundaries of, and likely managed exclusively by one
city for strictly intra-city flights. Thus, even though federal aviation
regulators may have an interest in harmonizing all ODM rules, they will
need to account for the local nature of ODM operations. By analogy,
although every city has stop signs and red lights for vehicular traffic,
placement of those signals is dictated by local concerns. So, too, might

92. The power of a state to preempt and subordinate local law—referred to as Dillon’s
Rule—derives from an interpretation of a local government’s authority in which a local or
municipal government (i.e., a “substate”) may engage in an activity only if it is specifically
sanctioned by the state government. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, Local Government
Authority, https://bit.ly/2xHzw0C (last visited May 20, 2020); see also JOHN F. DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448 (5th ed. 1911).
93. See Charles S. Rhyne, Federal, State and Local Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation,
11 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 459 (1946).
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federal rules for ODM have to accommodate rather than preempt local
realities.
Although how the doctrine of preemption will play out in the UAM
space is unclear, a comparison of the legal and regulatory challenges for
UAM with those of unmanned aerial systems—“UAS” or “drones”—may
be helpful in the near term, if for no other reason than to emphasize that
federal, state, and local governments will need to achieve greater and
perhaps unique levels of cooperation if UAM ideas are to succeed. The
case of Singer v. City of Newton is a leading example.94 At issue in Singer
was whether an ordinance enacted by the City of Newton, Massachusetts
to safeguard local privacy complied with federal aviation regulations
relating to UAS. By its own terms, the purpose of the ordinance was to
strike a balance between encouraging innovation and the use of pilotless
aircraft while also reasonably safeguarding the public:
It is important to allow beneficial uses of these devices while also
protecting the privacy of residents throughout the City. In order to
prevent nuisances and other disturbances of the enjoyment of both
public and private space, regulation of pilotless aircraft is required. The
following section is intended to promote the public safety and welfare
of the City and its residents. In furtherance of its stated purpose, this
section is intended to be read and interpreted in harmony with all
relevant rules and regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration,
and any other federal, state and local laws and regulations.95

In this context, the ordinance specifically: (1) required the registration of
all drones; (2) prohibited pilotless aircraft flight below 400 feet over any
private property without the express written permission of the property
owner; (3) prohibited pilotless aircraft flight over public property with
prior permission from the city; and (4) banned the flight of pilotless
aircraft “at a distance beyond the visual line of sight of the Operator.”96
The plaintiff challenged subsections of the ordinance relating to drone
registration and operation.97 He argued that the ordinance was preempted
by federal law because it attempted to regulate—and, therefore, conflicted
with—an almost exclusively federal area of law, i.e., the regulation of
airspace.98 In contrast, the city asserted that the ordinance was not
preempted by federal law because it fell within an area of law that the FAA

94. See generally Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F.Supp.3d 125 (D. Mass. 2017). The
case was appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, but then voluntarily dismissed.
See Singer v. City of Newton, No. 17–2045, 2017 WL 8942575, at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 7,
2017).
95. Singer, 284 F.Supp.3d at 128 (2017).
96. See id. at 128.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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expressly carved out for local governments to regulate, and thus could be
read in harmony with federal aviation laws and regulations.99
The court struck down the ordinance under the doctrine of conflict
preemption.100 The city’s choice to restrict drone use below 400 feet
worked to eliminate any drone use in the confines of the city, absent prior
permission, the court stated.101 This ordinance thwarted not only the
FAA’s objectives, but also those of Congress for the FAA to integrate
drones into the national airspace.102 Moreover, the court concluded that
although Congress and the FAA may have contemplated co-regulation of
drones to a certain extent, this hardly permitted an interpretation that
essentially constituted a wholesale ban on drone use in Newton.103
Since the court’s ruling in 2017, many UAS industry observers have
characterized Singer as a leading case of first impression with respect to
emerging innovations in unmanned aviation.104 More specifically, UAS
and UAM industry analysts have recognized Singer as leaving little to no
space for state and local authorities to regulate the airspace within their
geographical jurisdiction:

99. See id.
100. The United States Supreme Court has established a general framework and
taxonomy that recognizes three different types of preemption: “express” preemption,
“implied” (field) preemption, and “conflict” preemption. First, federal laws are said to
preempt state law or local ordinances where the federal government occupies a field. To
determine the extent of federal authority in an area, courts recognize two types of
preemption, express and implied. Express preemption exists when the language of a
federal law communicates an explicit intent by Congress to preempt state law. Whether a
federal law preempts a state law is a question of congressional intent. Thus, if Congress
intended to govern an issue exclusively it need only say so and the law will be recognized
as the supreme law of the land pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Or, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “in every case, the act of
Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise
of powers not controverted, must yield to it.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824). More often than not, however, federal laws are not express or unambiguous and
courts must determine the intent of Congress, i.e., implied preemption.
Implied preemption consists of two subcomponents, “conflict preemption” and “field
preemption.” Conflict preemption is said to exist either when compliance with both the
federal and state laws is a “physical impossibility,” or when the state law stands as an
“obstacle” to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. Courts have found that the latter exists when a court determines that a federal
regulatory scheme is so pervasive that Congress must have intended to leave no room for
a state to supplement it. Courts generally understand field preemption to mean that federal
law “thoroughly occupies” the “legislative field” in question, e.g., the field of aviation
safety. Field preemption analysis frequently comes up in the arena of aviation safety; courts
have found that safety-related issues such as aircraft certification typically fall within the
exclusive province of the federal government.
101. See Singer, 284 F.Supp.3d at 128.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See also John Goglia, What’s the Status of Local Drone Ordinances after the
Singer Decision?, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://bit.ly/2R8Nsrw.
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[W]hen it comes to certain UAS operations[,] . . . federal law preempts
local regulations. A city cannot regulate flight operations, and it may
not effectively ban drone flights against the express congressional
intent to encourage drone use. Even though the ordinance intended to
protect the city citizens’ privacy, portions of it extended into the FAA’s
operational safety and licensing authority and was struck down.105

In this regard, Singer foreshadows potential preemption problems for
UAM manufacturers, owners, and operators, and puts a premium on
cooperation among authorities at various layers of government even for
putatively local activities. In fact, among the states that have proposed or
enacted UAS-related laws—laws that may serve as a precursor to similar
UAM operations—many have explicitly relinquished or rendered inferior
their authority relative to that of the federal government.106 For example,
Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia state laws prohibit municipalities
from regulating UASs.107 Meanwhile, a law proposed in Arizona would
prohibit the operation of a model aircraft or civil unmanned aircraft “if the
operation is prohibited by a federal law or regulation that governs
aeronautics.”108 The law would have materially constrained local
lawmaking powers relative to drones, too:
Except as authorized by law, a political subdivision of this state may
not enact or adopt any ordinance, policy or rule that relates to the
ownership or operation of an unmanned aircraft, an unmanned aircraft
system, a civil unmanned aircraft or a public unmanned aircraft or
otherwise in engage in the regulation of the ownership or operation of
an unmanned aircraft, an unmanned aircraft system, a civil unmanned
aircraft or a public unmanned aircraft if the ordinance, policy or rule is
more prohibitive than or has a penalty that is greater than any state law
penalty, whether enacted or adopted before or after the effective date
of this section.109

Similarly, lawmakers in Florida proposed an “Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Act” that explicitly preempted local governments from regulating a wide
assortment of UAS-related activities—including design, manufacture, and
105. HAMILTON, supra note 61, at 21; see also Cecilia Kang, FAA Drone Laws Start
to Clash with Stricter Local Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2015), https://nyti.ms/348Vt4S.
106. See generally TIMOTHY M. RAVICH, COMMERCIAL DRONE LAW: DIGEST OF U.S.
AND GLOBAL UAS RULES, POLICES, AND PRACTICES (Am. Bar Ass’n 2017).
107. An Act Concerning Municipalities and Unmanned Aircraft, S.B. 975, Gen.
Assemb., Jan. 2017 Sess. (Conn. 2017) (enacted), https://bit.ly/3a0clvW; Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Research, Development, Regulation, and Privacy Act of 2015, S.B. 370,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015) (enacted), https://bit.ly/2XtovLk; Aircraft Certain; Local
Regulation, H.B. 412, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (enacted), https://bit.ly/2XqI7Qj.
108. Unmanned Aircraft: Prohibited Operations, S.B. 1449, 52d Leg., (Az. 2016),
available at https://bit.ly/3b1vKhs.
109. Id.
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operator credentialing—except in matters relating to “nuisances,
voyeurism, harassment, reckless endangerment, property damage, or other
illegal acts arising from the use of unmanned aircraft systems.”110 To a
large extent, the number of state laws respecting UAS is owed to the fact
that state legislatures were frustrated with and tried to fill gaps caused
by the FAA’s pace of UAS rulemaking.
Fortunately, efforts are underway in the UAM space that feature a
level of cooperation not initially achieved for UAS owners and operators.
As an aviation executive testified, despite the local integration needs of
UAM,
it is important that standards for the aircraft and for operations are
common across the US and preferably across the globe. To that end, it
is important that federal preemption for the FAA in the area of aviation
is respected legislatively and judicially. Close coordination and
cooperation with governments and regulatory agencies is critical for
the development of appropriate regulation that provides a clear path to
compliance and authorization to operate with guardrails, rather than
roadblocks.
Furthermore, the FAA, EASA and other regulators should work
together to develop a globally coordinated safety system expectations
through agreed upon consensus standards that ensure the viability of
reciprocal airworthiness acceptance. We are encouraged in this regard
by recent progress, including the activity of the General Aviation
Manufacturers Association Electric Propulsion Innovation Committee
(“GAMA EPIC”), which has brought both voices to the conversation
together, and we encourage both agencies to seek opportunities for
continued collaboration.111

Additionally, along with NASA’s “Grand Challenge,”112 the
Unmanned Aircraft System Integration Pilot Program (“UAS IPP”) offers
110. An Act Relating to Unmanned Devices, H.B. 1027, 2017 Leg., (Fl. 2017),
available at https://bit.ly/2xb7RFO. The proposed law specifically stated that, “[t]he
authority to regulate the operation of unmanned aircraft systems is vested in the state except
as provided in federal regulations, authorizations, or exemptions.” See id. The law further
established that a political subdivision of the state was forbidden from enforcing an
ordinance or resolution “relating to the design, manufacture, testing, maintenance,
licensing, registration, certification, or operation of an unmanned aircraft system, including
airspace, altitude, flight paths, equipment or technology requirements; the purpose of
operations; and pilot, operator, or observer qualifications, training, and certification.” See
id. That said, the law did not “not limit the authority of a local government to enact or
enforce local ordinances relating to nuisances, voyeurism, harassment, reckless
endangerment, property damage, or other illegal acts arising from the use of unmanned
aircraft systems if such laws or ordinances are not specifically related to the use of an
unmanned aircraft system for those illegal acts.” See id.
111. See Thacker Testimony, supra note 12.
112. Graham Warwick Washington, Grand Challenge will bring NASA, FAA and
Industry Together on UAM, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. (Sept. 18, 2019),
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a hopeful model for UAM firms. Begun in 2017, the UAS IPP has brought
state, local, and tribal governments together with private sector entities,
such as UAS operators or manufacturers, to test and evaluate the
integration of civil and public drone operations into the NAS.113 In doing
so, the program assists the FAA in crafting new rules that support more
complex low-altitude operations by: identifying ways to balance local and
national interests related to drone integration; improving communications
with local, state and tribal jurisdictions; addressing security and privacy
risks; and accelerating the approval of operations that currently require
special authorizations.114 The program has created “a meaningful dialogue
on the balance between local and national interests related to drone
integration, and provide actionable information” to federal regulators.115
In all, these and other programs may represent significant progress in
avoiding or mitigating thorny issues of preemption among local, state, and
national authorities.
C.

Airspace

As with drones, UAM operations implicate important propertyrelated questions—on and above the ground. These questions include
control and ownership of vertiport locations, charging stations for UAM
flight, and operations near and above privately-owned homes, downtown
office buildings, commercial spaces, and public forums like stadiums and
parks. In traditional aviation matters, an airport’s location and how its
activities might impact the neighboring community are typically matters
of land use and zoning that fall wholly or partially within the jurisdiction
of the affected local government and municipality. Whether local
authorities will oversee the highways—literally, the airspace—needed for
UAM above their geographic boundaries is unclear, however.
Wholly intra-city UAM operations seemingly fall within the police
powers of local governments in matters related to general health, safety,
and welfare. But federal aviation regulators have increasingly staked out
authority over all airspace “above the grass.” What is more, longstanding
legal precedent seems to confer the national government with vast powers
over all airspace, albeit without also specifying where, if anywhere, state
and local powers end and where federal powers begin in the sky.

https://go.nasa.gov/2y8LBfS (“The primary goal of GC-1 is to accelerate the UAM market
by collecting flight data to help the FAA develop test procedures, data requirements and
compliance methods for electric vertical-takeoff-and-landing (eVTOL) vehicle and pilot
certification as well as operational approval.”).
113. See UAS Integration Pilot Program, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://bit.ly/2VnJEUN (last modified Dec. 10, 2019, 2:58 PM).
114. See id.
115. Id.
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To illustrate, United States v. Causby is often cited as the seminal
case in which the United States Supreme Court recognized realities borne
of the jet age, nationalizing control over airspace by abandoning the
Roman doctrine of cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelom—“whoever owns
the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven.”116 In fact, Causby effectively capped
private property rights to “the immediate reaches above the land,”
affording public and private aviators an easement in the air—an
avigational easement—subject not to the mechanically applied law of
trespass but to the equitable balancing tests of takings law and eminent
domain.117 But, in the more than 70 years since Causby, the Supreme Court
has not identified a specific altitude as part of its “the immediate reaches
above the land” formulation. Consequently, state legislatures and courts,
together with federal aviation regulators, have filled the void, generally
regarding (without formally establishing) 500 feet above ground level as
the extent of private property ownership in urban areas.118
While this might suggest that local or state governments have
jurisdiction over aviation operations below 500 feet, the analysis is
complicated by a proposition that has served national aviation policy for
more than six decades. Specifically, the federal government, through the
FAA, has exclusive jurisdiction over airspace that includes aeronautical
activities on the ground. As explained by Justice Jackson in the 1944
decision of Northwest Airlines, Inc.:
Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating air
commerce. Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not
wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. Rather, they move only
by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of
federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal
commands. The moment a ship taxies onto a runway it is caught up in
an elaborate and detailed system of controls. It takes off only by
instruction from the control tower, it travels on prescribed beams, it
may be diverted from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and
orders. Its privileges, rights, and protection, so far as transit is
concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone and not to any
state government. 119

To be sure, the justification for nationalizing responsibility for safe and
efficient air navigation for traditional aviation operations is compelling.
General and commercial aviation involves almost 29.4 million square
miles of airspace and millions of people traveling daily by air over an area
that represents more than 17% of the world’s airspace, including all of the

116.
117.
118.
119.

See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
Id. at 266.
See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 n.3 (1989).
See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944).
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United States and large portions of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the
Gulf of Mexico.120
ODM, in contrast, is forecast to cover a substantially smaller distance
with few passengers per flight. Nevertheless, the FAA is likely to remain
the final authority over ODM operations, primarily in the interest of safety.
Indeed, Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, unifying air
space management under the FAA’s authority.121 The FAA’s authority to
manage and determine uses of the NAS are exclusive and indivisible.
Under 49 U.S.C. § 40101, the FAA has broad authority to regulate,
control, develop plans, and form policy for the use of navigable
airspace.122 Congress also vested the FAA with authority to “develop plans
and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation
or order the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft
and the efficient use of airspace.”123 With that authority, the FAA divided
the national airspace into regulatory airspace (i.e., Class A, B, C, D, and E
airspace areas, restricted and prohibited areas) and non-regulatory (i.e.,
military operations areas (“MOAs”), warning areas, alert areas, and
controlled firing areas.). Within these two categories, there are four types
of airspace: controlled; uncontrolled (e.g., Class G airspace is uncontrolled
airspace); special use, and other airspace; extending to outer space (flight
level 60,000 feet (“FL 600”)),124 as illustrated below:125

120. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2V2gie7.
121. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
122. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d) (providing that the FAA must consider several matters
as being in the public interest: (1) assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and
security as the highest priorities in air commerce; (2) regulating air commerce in a way that
best promotes safety and fulfills national defense requirements; (3) encouraging and
developing civil aeronautics, including new aviation technology; (4) controlling the use of
the navigable airspace and regulating civil and military operations in that airspace in the
interest of the safety and efficiency of both of those operations; (5) consolidating research
and development for air navigation facilities and the installation and operation of those
facilities; (6) developing and operating a common system of air traffic control and
navigation for military and civil aircraft; and (7) providing assistance to law enforcement
agencies in the enforcement of laws related to regulation of controlled substances, to the
extent consistent with aviation safety).
123. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2018).
124. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CLASSES OF AIRSPACE, https://bit.ly/348QxwS.
125. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRSPACE 101 — RULES OF THE SKY, fig. Airspace
Guidance for Small UAS Operators (Oct. 30, 2018), https://bit.ly/2X4SxVs.
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How and where UAM operations will fit into this regulatory scheme is unclear,
as is whether federal authorities (not local or state regulators) will have the power
to regulate access and control of the altitude airspace beneath the NAS (e.g., 400–
500 feet above ground level).
UAM aircraft are not monolithic, of course, and the variety of potential
UAM aircraft types presents unique challenges to regulators responsible for
airspace integration.126 Cruise speeds for UAM aircraft will range from
approximately 70 knots to 200 knots or more (i.e., 80 to 230 miles per hour) and
different eVTOL will feature hovering capabilities that may vary from ninety
seconds to multiple tens of minutes. “These variations in performance will have
significant implications on airspace design and operating procedures for airspace
integration, such as holding patterns near vertiports, right-of-way rules, and/or
constraints on vertiport access to vehicle classes with compatible operating
envelopes.” 127 Moreover:
[b]y definition, the scope of UAM operations is within a metropolitan
area . . . For metropolitan areas that are located further away from
airports, UAM operations would have their origin, their destination, or
both, be in Class E or Class G airspace. Although Class E airspace is
controlled airspace, aircraft operating under [visual flight rules] in
Class E airspace are not required to be in contact with ATC [air traffic
control].
This is also true of flights in Class G, which is uncontrolled airspace.
On the other hand, for metropolitan areas that are located near airports,
UAM operations may be conducted entirely within Class B airspace

126. The Vertical Flight Society has tracked a total of more than 200 different aircraft
designs by companies claiming to have eVTOL aircraft, though few have significant
financial backing. See Press Release, Vertical Flight Soc’y, Vertical Flight Society Reports
More than 200 eVTOL Aircraft Now in Development (Sept. 8, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2wbPPTf. In 2019, the FAA issued a Request for Information to the eVTOL
industry to begin the process of developing policy guidance for testing and certifying
eVTOL. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., VERTICAL TAKEOFF AND LANDING DESIGNS (Apr. 3,
2019), https://bit.ly/39Jh6Ki.
127. See Thipphavong et al., supra note 8, at 7–8.
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around major airports, Class C airspace around medium-sized airports,
or Class D airspace around smaller airports.
For example, downtown Dallas lies entirely within Class B airspace
due to its proximity to Dallas-Fort Worth airport. The extent to which
UAM operations would be allowed to occur in these classes of airspace
would depend on the departure location, arrival location, and/or
constraining factors (e.g., noise restrictions and obstacles). Under
present-day rules, UAM flights would be required to communicate
with ATC prior to entering Class B, C, or D airspace.128
As such, the amount of coordination as a practical and legal matter for UAM
operations will be extensive.
Recently, NASA developed a set of guiding principles informed by prior
work on ODM tenets related to UAM airspace integration concepts, technologies,
and procedures that could evolve as NASA learns and collaborates with the UAM
community and the broader aviation community.129 The principles include:
1.

UAM should require minimal additional ATC infrastructure
(e.g., radar systems, controller positions) and minimal
changes to FAA automation systems used for ATC.

2.

UAM should impose minimal additional workload on
controllers beyond their current duties for existing airspace
users.

3.

UAM should impose minimal additional requirements or
burdens on existing airspace users beyond equitable access to
airspace resources.

4.

UAM will meet the regulatory requirements for vehicle-level
and system-level safety and security, such as timely and
assured data exchange and the elimination of single points of
failure and common failure triggers.

5.

UAM will be resilient to a wide range of disruptions, from
weather and localized sub-system failures (e.g., a single
vehicle or software tool) to widespread disruptions (e.g., GPS
failure).

6.

UAM will economically scale to high-demand operations
with minimal fixed costs.

7.

UAM will support user flexibility and decision making to the
greatest extent possible.

Although a step forward, these principles leave unresolved the important
issue of implementation among federal, state, and local regulators. For that matter,
regulators at various levels of government will need to achieve significant
128. Id.
129. See id.
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cooperation if UAM ideas are to succeed, and it seems that local authorities will
need to work around federal regulators, not the other way around. As the FAA
stated in a “Fact Sheet” in December 2015 entitled “State and Local Regulation
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),”130 state and local restrictions “should be
consistent with the extensive federal statutory and regulatory framework
pertaining to control of the airspace, flight management and efficiency, air traffic
control, aviation safety, navigational facilities, and the regulation of aircraft noise
at its source.”131 In the context of drones, the FAA stated:
Substantial air safety issues are raised when state or local governments
attempt to regulate the operation or flight of aircraft. If one or two
municipalities enacted ordinances regulating UAS in the navigable
airspace and a significant number of municipalities followed suit,
fractionalized control of the navigable airspace could result. In turn,
this “patchwork quilt” of differing restrictions could severely limit the
flexibility of FAA in controlling the airspace and flight patterns, and
ensuring safety and an efficient air traffic flow. A navigable airspace
free from inconsistent state and local restrictions is essential to the
maintenance of a safe and sound air transportation system. 132
While this may be true for the operation of commercial airliners flying over state
lines, it is not clear that this conception of airspace necessarily holds for ODM
where the local concerns may predominate over state and national policies.

D.

Community Acceptance

Congress vested the FAA with exclusive authority to manage the national
airspace system133 only after several tragedies exposed unacceptable flaws in the
government’s approach to airspace management. In 1956, a TWA Constellation
and United Airlines DC-7 collided and fell into the Grand Canyon. A year later,
debris from a mid-air collision involving a United States Air Force jet fell onto a
junior high school playground, killing three students and injuring 70 others.134 As
a consequence of these tragedies, Congress airspace management under the
authority of the FAA, and in no small measure, modern commercial airline travel
safety is extraordinarily safe as a direct result. As a Dutch aviation consulting firm

130. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 1, 1 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://bit.ly/2X6ZCVv
[hereinafter Fact Sheet].
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2 (first citing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir.
2007); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989); then citing Arizona
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where Congress occupies an entire field . . .
even complimentary state regulation is impermissible. Field preemption reflects a
congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to
federal standards.”); and then citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
386–87 (1992)).
133. See supra Section III.C.
134. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3741–42 (1958).
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estimated in 2018, the fatal accident rate for large commercial passenger flights
is 0.06 million flights, or one fatal accident for every 16 million flights.135
For aerial ridesharing to attain popular and mass-scale acceptance and
adoption at similar scale—not only from potential passengers but also from third
parties impacted by ODM—UAM firms will likely need to match the safety rate
of commercial airliners and certainly will need to exceed the accident rate of
automobiles. In this context, Uber has framed the critical issue of UAM safety as
a function of community acceptance not of commercial airplanes, but of
traditional cars:
For widespread public adoption of VTOLs as a ridesharing option,
riding in a VTOL must be safer than riding in an automobile. In order
that VTOLs are accepted by the market, claiming that the vehicles are
merely as safe as driving, particularly given the active public discourse
regarding potential safety improvements from autonomous vehicles,
will almost certainly be insufficient. Additionally, the general public
is very aware that flying commercial airlines is significantly safer than
driving, which puts upward pressure on safety of any aviation offering,
especially one intended for daily use.

While scheduled airlines operating under [14 C.F.R.] Part 121 of the
FAA Federal Aviation Regulations (“FAR”) will almost certainly
remain the safest mode of transport, our initial target is to achieve a
safety level that is twice that of driving a car based on number of
fatalities-per-passenger mile. Today, using [14 C.F.R.] Part 135
helicopter and fixed-wing operations as the closest proxy, the safety
level in air-taxi aviation is two times worse than driving, which means
we would need to see an improvement of four times (from 1.2 to 0.3
fatalities per 100 million passenger miles) to achieve that target. It’s
important to note, however, that while we’ve set this goal, regulators
would not necessarily require significantly more stringent VTOL
safety targets than automobiles. Additionally, the regulatory
discussion will be complex because safety can be measured on a
number of dimensions (e.g. injuries, accidents).136
At one level, ODM aircraft, like aircraft generally, may offer safety mechanisms
not achievable by car. On the other hand, on-demand aviation presents
severalhazards that are both unique and incomparable to cars—the operator (a
human being or autonomous computer) cannot just pull over to the side of the
road.
Among the top concerns associated with UAM arethe airplanes themselves.
This includes the potential for loss of electrical power to control systems, the risk
of vehicle fly-away, failure of autonomous systems and critical sensors and sensor

135. See, e.g., David Shepardson, 2017 Safest Year on Record for Commercial
Passenger Air Travel, REUTERS (Jan. 1, 2018), https://reut.rs/2URV0jl.
136. UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis added).
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arrays, and servicing and maintenance.137 These concerns are in addition to
externalities like the loss of safety-critical functions at a ground station,
inadequate pilot training, lack of vertiport availability, inadequate ground crew,
passenger interference with pilot or vehicle operations, passenger illness during
flight, and cybersecurity and hijacking of communication and control links.138
And, of course, the most significant externality of all—the environment—looms
in the nature of weather (i.e., convective weather like hail and severe downdrafts),
obstacles like buildings, power lines, airborne vehicles, and birds.139
Even if these safety concerns can be allayed, the issue of noise presents
another significant barrier to wide-spread UAM acceptance. As Uber has noted,
“VTOLs will operate directly overhead, and in close proximity to, densely
populated urban areas . . . While communities tend to tolerate public safety flights
(such as medical helicopters) because the flights are infrequent and have clear
community value, they historically oppose other uses due to noise.”140 In his
congressional testimony, Michael Thacker, the Executive Vice President for
Technology and Innovation at Bell, framed the issue of UAM noise in this way:
[W]e plan to be operating in urban areas, in and around a lot of people.
This comes with a safety expectation that protects both passengers and
people on the ground, even in failure scenarios. It will also require an
affordable solution accessible by most people. This is critical to
acceptance—why would people accept aircraft operating in their
neighborhood if they can’t take advantage of them?
Another critical component of acceptance is managing the acoustic
signature of ODM aircraft. One of the greatest hindrances to vertical
lift operations in cities today is noise. To succeed in urban
environments, breakthrough reductions in vehicle noise generation are
a must. 141
In all, if aerial ridesharing is to get to market and exist as a sustainable mode
of transportation, UAM firms will need to satisfy the concerns of two
communities primarily: regulators and the general public. Notwithstanding the
diversity of regulators and communities that UAM will impact, safety and noise
are common concerns. And, in that regard, UAM manufacturers will need to
comply with the regulations promulgated by aviation authorities around the globe,
including standards for vehicle design, production, pilot licensing, and
maintenance and operating requirements.142 The United States and European
markets are key to achieving mass-scale adoption given that the FAA and EASA
function as regulators for 50% and 30% of the world’s aviation activity,
respectively.143 Altogether, the challenge of gaining community acceptance lies
137. See Thipphavong et al., supra note 8, at 9.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 22. Under 14 C.F.R. Part 36, Subparts H and K,
the FAA has set thresholds for community noise around airports for fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters, and tiltrotors.
141. See also Thacker Testimony, supra note 12.
142. See UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 22.
143. See id.
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in the fact that there are many different types of communities and stakeholders
which UAM manufacturers, owners, and operators must address.

IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Like commercial drones, aerial ridesharing at mass-scale epitomizes the
“Internet of Things” and the modern era in which rare technologies are pervasive
in both effect, ownership, and use.144 But, as an Economist article stated in the
context of drones:
Moving bits around the internet is one thing; moving atoms around in
the real world is something else entirely. In the two decades of the
internet era, many world-changing technologies—web-publishing,
file-sharing, online auctions, internet telephony, virtual currencies,
ride-hailing—have raised new legal and regulatory questions. In each
case, regulators had to work out the rules after the event: figuring out
how libel law applies to the web, banning the sale of Nazi memorabilia,
deciding whether Bitcoin is a currency, determining whether Uber
drivers are employees or contractors, and so on. But drones are a
different matter, because of the danger that flying robots pose to life
and limb, and the existence of strict rules that govern the use of
physical airspace. Their future will depend as much on decisions made
by regulators as it does on technological advances. How will it play
out?145
Historically, the answer—from bicycles146 to cars147 to airplanes148—has been
that regulators outlaw or impede the ownership and/or use of disruptive
technologies until the safety of the innovation is established and/or society accepts
the risks attendant to a particular innovation, trading off its drawbacks with its
benefits. That has been, and likely is, the regulatory trajectory for UAM firms.
Unfortunately, if that is the case, the benefits of UAM “may not come about if
preemptive, precautionary policy interventions limit new innovation
opportunities.”149 In the drone space, for example, precautionary, principle-based
policymaking based on ephemeral fears and stringent prophylactic restrictions,
including untimely rulemaking, aggressive enforcement arguably at odds with
historic policy guidance, regulatory decisions made with incomplete data and

144. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15
WIDENER L.J. 667, 669 (2006) (“[I]nstead of being an externality, something we
consciously utilize for a specific purpose, pervasive technology disappears into the
background and becomes an integral part of our lives.”).
145. The Future of Drones Depends on Regulation, not just Technology, ECONOMIST
(June 10, 2017), https://econ.st/3bLd59U.
146. See, e.g., State v. Yopp, 97 N.C. 477, 481 (1887).
147. See, e.g., Lewis v. Amorous, 59 S.E. 338, 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907).
148. Early courts characterized aviation an ultra-hazardous activity to which the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. See generally Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Rowe, 226 F.2d
365 (8th Cir. 1955).
149. Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing
Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation, RICH. J.L & TECH., 2015, at
117.
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overreach has limited the rate of growth of an emerging industry.150 As such, one
scholar argues a different approach:
[Perhaps t]he better alternative to a top-down regulation is to deal with
concerns creatively as they develop, using a combination of
educational efforts, technological empowerment tools, social norms,
public and watchdog pressure, industry best practices and selfregulation, transparency, and targeted enforcement of existing legal
standards (especially torts) as needed. This bottom-up and layered
approach to dealing with problems will not preemptively suffocate
technological experimentation and innovation in these spaces.151
In this framework, treating ODM as a “permissionless innovation” may be
appropriate whereby,
experimentation with new technologies and business models should
generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be
made that a new invention will bring serious harm to individuals,
innovation should be allowed to continue unabated, and problems—if
they develop, at all—can be addressed later. Permissionless innovation
is not an absolutist position that denies any role for government.
Rather, it is an aspirational goal that stresses the benefit of pushing
“innovation allowed” as the best default position to begin debates
about technology policy. The burden of proof is on those who favor
preemptive, precautionary controls to explain why ongoing trial-anderror experimentation with new technologies or business models
should be disallowed.152
To be clear, regulators have an important and appropriate role to play in the UAM
space. As a threshold matter, aviation regulators ought to play a material role in
the certification and testing of eVTOL. As two fatal crashes of the Boeing 737
MAX are proving, regulatory lapses have dire consequences in aviation and the
opportunity for firms to shirk regulatory requirements if left alone is real.153 But,
the potential benefits of UAM will not be possible if the precautionary regulatory
configuration historically associated with disruptive technologies prevails.
In this sense, the work of Harvard Law Professor, Lawrence Lessig, may
offer a productive analytical framework for realizing UAM. His socio-economic
theory, or New Chicago School theory, of regulation imagines four regulatory
forces: the law; social norms; the market; and architecture.154

150. See, e.g., Timothy M. Ravich, Grounding Innovation: How Ex-Ante
Prohibitions and Ex-Post Allowances Impede Commercial Drone Use, 2018 COLUM. B. L.
REV. 495, 580 (2018).
151. Thierer, supra note 149, at 3–4.
152. Id. at 39–40.
153. See, e.g., Andy Pasztor & Alison Sider, Boeing Workers Made Light of MAX
Safety, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2020, at A1.
154. See Lawrence Lessig, Pathetic Dot Theory, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Mar. 14,
2013, 5:09 PM), https://bit.ly/2JF8E4l.
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In this scheme, each force applies pressure in the direction of an overarching
policy goal—in the case of UAM: high-density, high-tempo aerial ridesharing
between and within suburbs and cities. Lessig used seatbelts to illustrate his
theory:
The government may want citizens to wear seatbelts more often. It
could pass a law to require the wearing of seatbelts (law regulating
behavior directly). Or it could fund public education campaigns to
create a stigma against those who do not wear seatbelts (law regulating
social norms as a means to regulating behavior). Or it could subsidize
insurance companies to offer reduced rates to seatbelt wearers (law
regulating the market as a way of regulating behavior). Finally, the law
could mandate automatic seatbelts, or ignition-locking systems
(changing the code of the automobile as a means of regulating belting
behavior). Each action might be said to have some effect on seatbelt
use; each has some cost. The question for the government is how to get
the most seatbelt use for the least cost.155
Like seatbelt usage, the goal of UAM can be encouraged by the law, market,
product architecture, and public understanding. And, in fact, that is happening.
Unlike the tug of war and preemption fights between states and the federal
government that occurred in the ramp up to commercial drone regulations,
lawmakers are approaching UAM relatively more collaboratively and
cooperatively.156 Regulators are also embracing market-based approaches to
encouraging UAM. including with its “Grand Challenge” initiative designed to
provide a proving ground where NASA, vehicle providers, airspace technology
providers, and the public will learn what it really requires to achieve UAM.157
Product architecture is also encouraging UAM viability and acceptance as
vehicles themselves are outfitted with extraordinary safety capabilities. For
example, by avoiding the use of a large rotor, a DEP aircraft is able to take
advantage of Ballistic Recovery Systems (“BRS”). BRS provide whole vehicle
155. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 93–94 (New York:
Basic Books, 1999).
156. See supra notes 104 & 105 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 104 & 105 and accompanying text.
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parachutes that can be deployed in an emergency to safely bring the vehicle to the
ground, and allow the aircraft to avail itself of other evolving safety technologies
being tested such as whole aircraft airbags.158 Finally, social norms may be
changing as an Airbus survey of more than 1500 respondents in Mexico City, Los
Angeles, Switzerland, and New Zealand, showed that 44% supported, or strongly
supported, deploying unmanned traffic management (“UTM”), a critical
component of making UAM a reality.159 All of these factors trend favorably for
UAM firms.
But, all of this assumes that governmental actors (at the local, state, or
national levels) desire UAM. According to a Booz Allen Hamilton market study,
desire for UAM is not universal. Places like Phoenix, Miami, San Diego, and
Orlando currently have favorable regulations for UAM. But areas that most need
relief from traffic, including New York, Washington, D.C., and Boston, have an
unfavorable regulatory environment for UAM.160 The bottom line, therefore, is
that persuading lawmakers that UAM is achievable and desirable is a significant
impediment at the outset of the ODM research and investment.

V.

CONCLUSION

Among the biggest consumer trends in 2020 is the goal of better travel. In this
regard, the appetite for UAM and ODM is great and underserved:
As the world’s population becomes increasingly urban, residents are
growing frustrated with congested roads and overcrowded public
transportation. More people now turn to navigation apps to plan their
journeys and offer real-time updates on the best way to travel via train,
taxi, electric bike, scooter, helicopter or a customized combination of
them all. “Consumers want their transportation across cities to be
modular and personalized to their individual needs in 2020 as they
embrace a crowded world that is no longer seen as car-first,”
Euromonitor says.161
Of course, more consumers expect customized products and services for
themselves, this expectation does not readily translate into embracing the
possibility of flying in pilotless airplanes just above tall buildings in “smart”
cities. For that matter, substantial literature exists about the fear many people have
of flying in traditional aircraft,162 and narratives that catastrophize the advent of
flying cars further complicate the prospect of ODM. Several known and unknown
factors suggest that UAM may not occur (ever), or at least, that ODM may not
achieve the type of high-tempo, high-density activities that some imagine in as
little time as the next decade or two. In any case, from a legal and policy

158. See UBER ELEVATE, supra note 1, at 21.
159. See Urban Air Mobility: On The Path to Public Acceptance, AIRBUS (Feb. 11,
2019), https://bit.ly/2JBhUGz.
160. See HAMILTON, supra note 61, at 16.
161. Ellen Byron, Top Consumer Trends for 2020, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2020, at A11.
162. See Margaret Oakes & Robert Bor, The Psychology of Fear of Flying (Part I):
A Critical Evaluation of Current Perspective on the Nature, Prevalence and Etiology of
Fear of Flying, 8 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE 327 (2010).
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perspective, UAM represents one of the rare disruptive technological innovations
for which the law can lead.

